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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
1934) ; Stanley et al. v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Ill. 1933) (invokink Section 7a of N.I.R.A.). It is difficult to see how comparison between the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wisconsin Labor Code lends the Court authority
for holding that section 268.18 is a declaration of labor's rights. The comparison
instead tends to create doubt as to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Labor
Code. State bills modelled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been deemed unconstitutional. In re Opinion of the Justices, (N.H. 1933) 166 Atl. 640 (invading
rights of personal liberty and property under 14th Amendment, discriminatory,
depriving Courts of inherent power) ; Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580,
176 N.E. 649 (1931) (depriving persons of property without due process, limiting power of courts); cf. Thoe v. Chicago M. & St. Paul R. Co., 181 Wis. 456,
195 N.W. 407 (1923) (legislative limitation on judicial powers of Circuit Courts
Held unconstitutional) ; see John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W.
576, 580 (1932) ; Legis. (1934) 9 Wis. L. Rev. 278, 284.
Section 268.18, if a valid declaration of labor's rights, does not give rise to
any greater rights than Section 7a. Cf. Section 109.04 (2a), Laws of Wisconsin
(1933) Chap. 476 (The "7a" of the Wisconsin Act for Emergency Promotion of
Industrial Recovery). Doubt as to the practical advantages accruing to labor
under Section 7a has been expressed. Comment (1934) 43 Yale L.J. 625; cf.
Note (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 85, 118; (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 712. But in Wisconsin, as a result of Section 7a and its interpretation by the National Labor
Board, labor unionization has made more progress than in any other State.
Lacher, Rule by Riot, The Iron Age (Oct. 1934); Kohler, Interpreting Section
7a with Bricks, Nations Business (Nov. 1934). The interpretation in the instant
case placed on the words "interference, restraint or coercion" imputes to them
a meaning favorable to labor. A refusal to bargain with the chosen representative comes within their purview and being unlawful may be restrained. Trustees
of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., supra;
Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 462, 168 Ati. 862 (1933).
Contra: H. B. Rosenthal v. Ettlinger Co. v. Echlossberg, et al., 149 Misc. 210,
266 N.Y.S. 762 (1933) (refusal to bargain is not a violation of Section 7a);
cf. Durable Sportswear Co. v. Helliman, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1933, at 8 (Sup. Ct.).
But the decision leaves open the question of whether refusing to accept the profferred terms of the employee's chosen representative amounts to a refusal to
bargain [discussed in McNatt, Organized Labor and the Recovery Act (1933-4)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 780; cf. Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective Bargainingunder
Section 7 (a) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 275, 295 (1934)]. Should that question be decided in
the negative the injunction is worthless to labor. If it be decided in the affirmative, labor would virtually become the dictator.
The Wisconsin court hopes that capital and labor will deal justly, fairly,
and considerately with each other. This can not result from having the courts
vaguely, abstractly and broadly define and allegedly uphold the respective rights
of capital and labor. The solution seems to lie in the formation within an industry of codes created by the joint action of both parties and containing concrete
and specific determinations of the relationships between them. Note (1933) 47
Harv. L. Rev. 85,125.
GERRIT D. FOSTER.
PARENT AND CHILD-ADOPTION

STATUTES-RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD TO IN-

HERIT FROM NATURAL PARENTS.-A and B, natural children of an intestate
decedent, are claimants to the estate. B, when eight years of age, was legally
adopted by X. A claims as sole heir, contending that B has lost the status of

RECENT DECISIONS
heir at law in the estate of the decedent by virtue of the adoption. Held, A and
B are both heirs of the natural parent, adoption is not a bar to inheritance by B.
In re Estate of Martha Sauer (Wis., 1934) 257 N.W. 28.
Adoption, a practice unknown and unrecognized by the common law, has
existed among the nations of continental Europe from time immemorial. See,
Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 393, 45 S.W. 750, 757, 759 (1888) ; Ross v. Ross, 129
Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321, 325 (1880). It was widely practiced, not only by
ancient peoples with high standards of civilization, but by the semi-barbaric
German tribes. See, Succession of Unforsake, 48 La. Ann. 546, 19 So. 602, 603
(1896). Under the Roman Law the adopted child was permitted to inherit from
his natural parents as well as from the parents by adoption. See, Sandar's "Institutes of Justinian," Lib. I, Tit. XII, XIII, pp. 113-120 (1st Am. Ed., 1876).
The adoption of children and strangers to the blood exists in this country
only by virtue of statute. See, Albing v. Ward, 137 Mich. 352, 100 N.W. 609, 610
(1904). In the absence of common law authority, the various states have invaded the legal systems of continental Europe in search of nuclei about which
to build, their statutory scheme. See, Power v. Haley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S.W. 683,
684 (1887). In most American jurisdictions the courts have recognized that these
statutory schemes permitting the adopted child to take by descent from the parents by adoption have not affected his right to inherit from his natural parents.
Pattersonv. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896); Wagner v. Varner, 50
Ia. 532 (1879); contra, Young v. Bridges, (N.H., 1933), 165 At. 272.
It was argued by the appellant in the principal case that the local legislature
had by its adoption statute indicated that the adopted child was not to take by
inheritance from its natural parents. Wis. Stats., (1933) § 322.07. The court
met this contention by pointing out that the legislature had deleted from the
original bill before it a specific provision purporting to deny the right of the
adopted child to take by inheritance from its natural parents. See, Asembly Bill
No. 237A, Session of 1929. The court said that this indicated that the legislature
did not mean that the adoption statute as eventually passed was to affect the
right of inheritance from the natural parents. Had the legislature literally purported to affect the right of inheritance from the natural parents there is reason
to believe that the Wisconsin court would have refused to uphold the statute.
The court has suggested several times that such statutes interfering with the
descent of property are subversive to the beneficent purposes of adoption, that
they are contrary to the natural and the common law, and are an unauthorized
invasion by the legislature of the rights of the individual. See, Nunnemacher v.
State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906) ; 'Estate of Bradley, 185 Wis. 393, 201
N.W. 973 (1925). It is submitted, too, that an attempted enforcement of such a
statute might raise a federal question under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625,
67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 96,
69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).
RicHARD B. JoHNs.
TORTS-JOINT ENTERPRISE-IMPUTED NEGLGENE.-A husband and wife jointly owned an automobile and both were the named assureds in the liability policy
issued thereon. In returning from a visit to their daughter's home and while
the husband was driving, they. collided with a freight car belonging to the defendant railway company. In the plaintiff wife's action against the defendant
husband and the defendant railway company, the jury found the plaintiff free
from contributory negligence and that she had assumed no risk; it found both de-

